Beyond Expressives: Explorations in Use-Conditional Meaning

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BRILL

EXPRESSIVES AND BEYOND:
AN INTRODUCTION TO VARIETIES
OF USE-CONDITIONAL MEANING

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1. INTRODUCTION

Formal semanticists, as is well known, have found it useful to make certain simplifying assumptions in approaching the vast field of natural language meaning.[1] Thus, following the lead of logicians, they have concentrated on rigidly stating truth conditions for declarative sentences in a quest for clarifying notions like *entailment, synonymy*, and *contradiction* (cf., for example, Dowty et al. 1981 or Gamut 1991). However, it was recognized right from the start that much work would remain to be done once the truth-conditional story was told. Again, it is well known that Frege himself directed attention to various lacunae (cf. Horn 2007): (i) the treatment of presupposition, which has oscillated between truth-conditional and "pragmatic" approaches ever since the seminal "Russell-Strawson debate" (Russell 1905; Strawson 1950);[2] (ii) the necessity for envisaging something like speech acts (cf. Frege's *Urteilsstrich*, which is called *assertion sign* by Geach 1965), which it took Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) to give theoretical shape to; and (iii) the phenomenon of expressivity, which Frege discussed under the term *Färbung* "colouring" (see Horn 2013 [this volume] as well as Dummett 1978: 93 and Green & Kortum 2007).[3]

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[1] A very good overview over that field is still provided by Lyons (1977). Among the many other sources are von Stechow & Wunderlich 1991, Lappin 1996, and, more recently, Maienborn et al. 2011.

[2] See Beaver & Geurts 2011, and references cited there.

[3] Many philosophers, disenchanted with the positivist undercurrents of 20th century philosophy of language, have pointed out the relevance of *emotive meaning* for the study of ethics and aesthetics (Hare 1952; Stevenson 1937). Stevenson (1937: 23) credits Ogden & Richards (1923) with the term *emotive meaning*. Likewise, Jakobson (1960), who uses the term for a function of language, credits Marty (1908) for it.

At the same time, researchers conceiving of language as a tool for communication (in the broadest sense possible) have always taken expressivity to constitute one of language's major functions (Bühler 1934; Jakobson 1960).[4] Although the need for unification was perhaps in the back of the minds of a lot of people, it took until the development of the field of pragmatics, beginning sometime in the late 1960s, that (one of) the missing link(s) between formalist and functionalist approaches to meaning was forged.[5] Pragmatics, of course, started out as an extremely heterogeneous enterprise, sometimes considered a "wastebasket" (Bar-Hillel 1971) or whatever "meaning minus truth conditions" (Gazdar 1979) amounts to. However, the conception that semantics focusses only on those aspects that are truth-conditionally relevant, leaving the rest to pragmatics, has been questioned.[6] At least, as Kaplan (1999: 42) notes, semantics should also deal with those "non-descriptive features of language that are associated with certain expressions by linguistic convention". As I hope to show in this survey, the empirical domain of conventional non-truth-conditional meaning proves to be very rich.

And even if non-truth-conditional meaning has more or less been neglected or at least excluded from formal studies of natural language meaning from the very beginning, expressions that are associated with non-truth-conditional meaning by linguistic convention have increasingly found their way into formally or analytically oriented literature since the "pragmatic turn", and recent decades have seen considerable steps toward integrating those aspects of meaning into semantic theory. In particular, building on previous efforts by Kaplan (1999), Chris Potts (2005, 2007c) managed to develop the formal tools to analyze expressives like *damn*, which have been well studied since then.

The following survey shall convince the skeptical reader that conventional non-truth-conditional meaning goes beyond expressives and is by no means a marginal phenomenon. Indeed, it can be found across all layers of language, from the word level down to the phonological level and

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[4] Concern with this aspect of language use can be traced back—at least—to Aristotle's study of rhetoric.

[5] Still one of the most useful introductions to pragmatics is the one by Levinson (1983). For further work, see, among other things, Horn & Ward 2004.

[6] The most famous deviation, emerging in the 1980s, is the development of dynamic semantic theories like discourse representation theory (DRT, e.g. see Beaver & Geurts 2007; Kamp & Reyle 1993, Heim's (1982) file change semantics or dynamic semantics see Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991).

up to the syntactic one, and even beyond that. That this may seem surprising to many formal semanticists only shows how deeply the focus on truth conditions is rooted in our perspective. In contrast, functionally oriented linguists may be astonished that the diversity of conventional non-truth-conditional expressions is presented as something noteworthy. The fact that such content comes in so many varieties should not be any more surprising than the fact that ordinary truth-conditional meaning can be found at all levels of linguistic analysis as well, since there are no *a priori* reasons why the non-truth-conditional domain should not be as diverse as the truth-conditional one. Furthermore, I will try to highlight the different ways in which conventional non-truth-conditional content interacts with truth-conditional meaning and, elaborating on Potts (2007c), discuss a couple of special properties of expressions that conventionally convey non-truth-conditional meaning.

Before going on, a few terminological remarks are in order. The phenomenon of meaning that is contributed by the conventional meaning of expressions but that nevertheless does not become part of the truth-conditional content of an utterance, has been given many different names over the years. For instance, it has been called *affective*, *colored* (Frege 1897/1979), *expressive* (Potts 2007c), *connotational*, *emotive* (Jakobson 1960), *evaluative*, *procedural* (Bezuidenhout 2004), *non-cognitive* (Cruse 1986), *non-descriptive*, *non-ideational*, *subjective*, and, of course, also *use-conditional* meaning (Recanati 2004). Clearly, not all of these terms are synonymous and they are often associated with different theoretical architectures, but the empirical overlap between all these concepts is so great that in many cases these labels can be substituted for each other. However, I take it that term *use-conditional meaning* perfectly captures the basic essence of the kind of meaning and seems relatively neutral, in contrast to, for instance, *procedural* meaning, which is directly tied to the ideas of relevance theory. At the same time, it is broad enough to capture the entire range of phenomena that we will investigate in the following, in contrast to, say, *emotive* or *expressive* meaning, which seem to be more restrictive in their application. Therefore, I will stick to Recanati's (2004) suggestion, which is also mentioned by Kaplan (1999). Accordingly, I will speak of *use-conditional content* and contrast it with the *truth-conditional*. In the same vein, expressions or constructions that contribute use-conditional content, will be referred to as *use-conditional items* or, for short, UCIs.

I will start the survey with various lexical expressions, as the lexicon is where the most obvious cases of use-conditional meaning can be found. After that, I will present use-conditional expressions below and beyond the

word level, ranging from morphological devices over syntactic constructions to intonation patterns. After the predominantly descriptive overview, I will do some analytical work by introducing some binary features that help to categorize the use-conditional phenomena discussed into five classes. First, expressions diverge with respect to the question of whether they carry only use-conditional meaning or whether they simultaneously contribute to the truth conditions of a sentence. I call this the *dimensionality* of a use-conditional expression. The second criterion concerns what I call their *functionality*. By this I mean the question of whether a use-conditional expression applies to an argument or already comes saturated. The last feature is called *resource-sensitivity* and concerns the question of whether a use-conditional item returns its truth-conditional argument or not. These three distinctions will not only be descriptive observations but will prove to provide good clues to what to look for when one develops formal analyses of use-conditional meaning.

2. The Word Level

The majority of conventional non-truth-conditional meanings studied so far come from lexical items, mostly words. The UCIs at the word level can be divided into different subgroups, depending on what kind of non-truth-conditional meaning they display. The resulting categorization is, of course, not clear-cut and serves primarily the function of providing structure to the following overview of the varieties of non-truth-conditional expressions.

2.1. *Expressives in the Narrow Sense*

The group of UCIs that has received the most attention in formal semantics are what I refer to as *expressives in the narrow sense*, i.e. expressions that express some emotional and evaluative attitude with a high degree of affectedness. Thanks to the work of Potts (2005, 2007b,c, 2012), who picks up the theme as laid out by Kaplan (1999), expressives have received a lot of attention during the last few years. Standard examples include pejorative epithets and attributive adjectives.[7]

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[7] Throughout this text, I will use **bold face** to highlight relevant aspects of the examples.

(1) *Epithets*

    a. That **bastard** Kresge is famous.   (Potts 2007c: 168)
    b. That **idiot** Kresge dropped the bottle again.[8]

(2) *Expressive attributive adjectives*

    a. I hear your **damn** dog barking.   (Potts 2005: 18)
    b. My **friggin'** bike tire is flat again.

Both epithets and expressive attributive adjectives contribute use-condi-
tional content and no truth-conditional meaning. From a truth-conditional
point of view, such expressions are therefore optional. Adding or omitting
them does not alter the truth conditions of a sentence. Accordingly, all the
variants of (2a) in (3) are truth-conditionally equivalent.

$$
(3) \quad \text{I hear your} \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \emptyset \\ \text{blasted} \\ \text{bloody} \\ \text{damn} \\ \text{fucking} \end{array} \right\} \text{dog barking.}
$$

Following Cruse (2004: 57), I call such expressives and other UCIs that do
not contribute anything to the truth-conditional dimension of meaning
expletive UCIs.[9]

    Of course, the expressive attitude conveyed by expletive UCIs like *damn*
or *bastard* is lost if they are omitted; or a different emotion may be displayed
when you use *awesome* instead of *damn*, but the truth-conditional content
remains unaffected. I will write this informally in a fraction-like fashion with
the use-conditional content on top of the truth-conditional one.[10]

$$
(4) \quad \text{I hear your damn dog barking} = \frac{\text{damn dog}}{\text{I hear your dog barking}}
$$

The entire meaning of (2a) consists of its truth conditions that equal the
ones of the variants in (3)—that the speaker hears the addressee's dog
barking, plus whatever use-conditional content is expressed by applying
damn to *dog*, e.g. that the speaker has a negative attitude towards the
addressee's dog.

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    [8] The use of the demonstrative *that* instead of the plain definite determiner enhances
the expressive nature of the epithet, cf. Lakoff 1974; Potts & Schwarz 2010 for the expressive
function of demonstratives in English and Section 2.3 for further expressive uses of pronouns.
    [9] Such semantic expletives must not be confused with syntactic expletives like *it* in *It's
raining*, which are semantically empty but are syntactically obligatory.
    [10] For the purposes of this survey, this kind of representation serves only illustrative
purposes and has no theoretical implications, even if the majority of the approaches to
use-conditional content take such multidimensionality seriously (Potts 2005).

Further examples of expressives in the narrow sense are interjections (Ameka 1992) such as *ouch* and *oops* as famously discussed by Kaplan (1999). In addition, some otherwise truth-conditional expressions like *man* or the already expressively loaded *shit* can be used as expressive interjections. Expressive adjectives like *damn* regularly can be used interjectively as well.[11]

(5) *Interjections*

    a. **Ouch**, I've hit my thumb!   (Kaplan 1999)
    b. **Oops!**   (Kaplan 1999)
    c. **Oh**, I have another suit.   (Ameka 1992)
    d. It's hot, **man**.   (McCready 2009)
    e. **Shit**, I've lost my keys!
    f. **Damn**, I've lost my keys!

Like expressive adjectives and epithets, interjections like these are expletive UCIs and do not add anything to the truth conditions of the sentence. However, what makes many interjections interesting is that they do not seem to interact with the truth-conditional content at all (*man* being an exception, see below). In contrast to the expressives discussed above, interjections do not need a truth-conditional argument—they are already saturated and convey an use-conditional attitude without further ado. Therefore, just as interjections can be omitted without effect on truth-conditions, the rest of the sentence can be dropped, leaving the use-conditional attitude intact.

(6) a. Damn!
    b. Ouch!
    c. Oops!
    d. Oh!

That is, even without any truth-conditional content, the examples in (6) express attitudes of anger, pain, awkwardness, or surprise respectively. Semantically, they are more isolated from the rest of the sentence than expressive adjectives or epithets are. This is mirrored by the syntactic fact that they appear only in peripheral positions.

(7) a. *I've lost my oops keys.
    b. *It's man hot!

Following Potts (2005: 65), I call such examples *isolated* UCIs. In contrast to the informal description of the meaning of a sentence containing an argument-seeking expressive like *damn* given in (4), the composition for

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[11] There are also interjections like *by god* that transcend the "word level."

(5a) looks like (8). That is, the truth-conditional meaning of a sentence containing an already saturated, isolated interjection consists of the semantic content of the sentence without the interjection, while its use-conditional part is given solely by the use-conditional content of the interjection itself.

(8)   Ouch, I've hit my thumb = $\dfrac{\text{I'm in pain}}{\text{I've hit my thumb}}$

A further group I want to subsume under the caption of expressives in the narrow sense are what could be called *expressively coloured* expressions (after Frege's *Färbung* "colouring"). These kinds of UCIs differ crucially from the expressions discussed so far. They are lexical items that have an ordinary truth-conditional denotation but in addition, have a use-conditional component that displays some (in most cases negative) attitude towards the denotation. A classic example comes from Frege (1897/1979: 140):

(9)   *Coloured expression*

   a. This **dog** howled the whole night.
   b. This **cur** howled the whole night.

The difference between *dog* and *cur* is that while the former is expressively neutral and just refers to the set of dogs, the latter additionally expresses a negative attitude towards members of the set or the set as a whole. A systematic set of expressively coloured expressions are ethnic slurs. By this label, I mean expressions that, besides denoting some kind of nationality or ethnic group, convey a derogative racist attitude.[12] As examples, I use the antiquated *Boche* and *Kraut*, both being derogative variants of *German*.

(10)   *Ethnic slurs*

   a. Lessing was a **Boche**.   (Williamson 2009: 149)
   b. Hitler was a **Kraut**.   (Saka 2007: 39)

The composition of coloured items is therefore very different from all the other kinds of expressions discussed in this section so far, because in contrast to expletive UCIs, they do make a truth-conditional contribution. In the case of *Kraut*, the truth-conditionally relevant part equals that of *German*, and for *cur*, it equals that of *dog*. Following McCready (2010), I will call UCIs that conventionally contribute both truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning *mixed UCIs*.

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[12] Amongst many others, cf. Green & Kortum 2007; Hom 2008, 2010; Hornsby 2001.

As shown above, expletive UCIs can be omitted from a sentence without altering its truth-conditional content. Since they also contribute truth-conditional content, this does not hold for mixed UCIs. The following example illustrates this point.[13]

(11) a. That Kraut Lessing wrote a lot of books. → Lessing was a German.
      b.   Lessing wrote a lot of books. ↛ Lessing was a German.

The sentence (11a) containing *that Kraut* implies that Lessing was a German. If the mixed UCI is omitted as in (11b), that entailment is lost, since the property of being German is contributed by the truth-conditional dimension of *Kraut*.

If you want to get rid of the negative attitude conveyed by ethnic slurs or another expressively-coloured expression without altering the truth conditions of the sentence, you have to substitute the racist slur by the corresponding neutral expression.

(12) a. Lessing was a German.
      b. Hitler was a German.
      c. This dog howled the whole night.

What the truth-conditionally equivalent, but expressively neutral, expression for a mixed UCI is, cannot be directly read off from the expression. This has to be encoded in the lexicon.[14]

The informal schema used above to illustrate the composition of the meaning of a sentence containing UCIs therefore needs to rely on lexical knowledge for coloured expressions. For (10) for instance, the use-conditional part of the sentence consists of the negative attitude expressed by it, while the truth-conditional part corresponds to the same sentence with *German* substituted for *Kraut*.

(13) Lessing was a Kraut = $\dfrac{\text{Generally, I don't like Germans}}{\text{Lessing was a German}}$

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[13] Note that we have to change the example to one in which the mixed UCI is used attributively, because otherwise, omitting it would render the sentence ungrammatical.

(i)   *Lessing was a.

[14] Diachronically, ethnic slurs may have some connection to what they denote truth-conditionally. Arguably, many slurs come into existence by some kind of metaphorical or metonymical process by which something that is in some relation to the intended referent—like the *Kraut* eaten by Germans—is used to refer to it, thereby conveying some expressive attitude. For the expressive power of metaphorical and metonymic transfers and their role in semantic change, cf. amongst others Claudi & Heine 1986; Traugott & Dasher 2001.

This already shows some interesting facts about the semantic composition of mixed UCIs, namely that while their truth-conditional component may fall under the scope of some semantic operator—like the past tense in the example—its use-conditional component does not (Potts 2005, 2007c). That is, whereas the truth-conditional part of *Lessing was a Kraut* means that there is some time prior to the utterance time for which *Lessing is a German* is true, the negative or jocular attitude against Germans displayed by *Kraut* is not evaluated with respect to that point in the past but is attributed to the utterance time and speaker. The same holds for other semantic operations like negation or questions (Cruse 2004: 57). Even the negated variant of *Lessing was a Kraut* and the corresponding question convey the anti-German sentiment. This is shown by the fact that the following discourse continuations are impossible.

(14) a. Descartes was not a Kraut. #But I like Germans.

    b. A: Was Descartes a Kraut?
          B: #No, Germans are nice.

Using again the informal fraction notation, the negation and question operators only show up at the lower truth-conditional level but not on the UC-layer on top of it.

(15)   Descartes was not a Kraut $= \dfrac{\text{Generally, I don't like Germans}}{\neg(\text{Descartes was a German})}$

(16)   Was Descartes a Kraut? $= \dfrac{\text{Generally, I don't like Germans}}{?(\text{Descartes was a German})}$

This feature may be called *scopelessness* (Potts 2005: 41) and it is the reason why ethnic slurs cannot be denied by a simple negation or used in a question without unfolding their offending content. This corresponds to a feature that Potts (2007c: 167) calls *immediacy*, by which he means that "like performatives, expressives achieve their intended act simply by being uttered".

A further observation to be made is that the coloured expressions discussed so far can be regarded as being *isolated* UCIs as well. On the one hand, they are of course more integrated than expletive UCIs because they also contribute to the truth-conditional tier and hence cannot be omitted without affecting the truth conditions or grammaticality of a sentence. But, on the other hand, their UC-content is isolated because the negative attitude does not apply to a specific argument in the sentence. That is, while the truth-conditional part of *Kraut* predicates over Lessing in the example, the negative attitude does not apply to Lessing, but to Germans in general (cf. McCready 2010). Using an informal paraphrase of *Kraut* to make this explicit, we have the following characterization of the sentence's truth- and use-conditional content.

(17)   Lessing was a Kraut= $\dfrac{\text{Generally, I don't like Germans}}{\text{Lessing was a German}}$

A negative attitude towards Lessing is not directly expressed by the ethnic slur. However, it can be inferred if the two levels of meaning are taken together. This is supported by the observation that a negative attitude towards Lessing can be cancelled, whereas this is not possible for the negative evaluation of Germans.

(18)   a.   Lessing was a Kraut, but he was fine guy.
       b.   #Lessing was a Kraut, but generally, I like Germans.
       c.   #Generally, I like Germans, but Lessing was a Kraut.

Before we leave the descriptive survey of expressives in the narrow sense, let me briefly mention a problem that holds for many of those expressions. As we have seen, a UCI like *damn* can be used as an expressive attributive adjective or as an expressive interjection. In the same vein, many UCIs are multifunctional. For instance, I have characterized *fucking* and *bloody* as expressive adjectives, in which case they are expletive UCIs that contribute nothing to the truth-conditional level of meaning. However, many expressive adjectives can also be used to modify or intensify another adjective, as discussed by Geurts (2007) and Morzycki (2011).

(19)   Rufus is $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{fucking} \\ \text{goddamn} \end{array} \right\}$ tall.

In such environments, *fucking* or *goddamn* cannot be considered as expletive but as mixed UCIs, because they make a contribution to the truth-conditional dimension by grading the adjective they modify. Therefore, *fucking* cannot be omitted without changing the truth-conditional content. This is illustrated by the following examples.

(20)   a.   Ringo is tall, but Rufus is fucking tall.
       b.   #Ringo is tall, but Rufus is tall.

To study the relations between different functions of expressives and, more generally, UCIs in order to find generalizations regarding their shiftability is an interesting research question that, to my knowledge, has not been addressed so far.

2.2. *Particles*

Besides all the different types of expressives in the narrow sense, there are many classes of expressions in different languages that arguably contribute to the use conditions of an utterance instead of affecting its truth-conditional meaning.

An entire part of speech that seems to have some kind of affinity to the use-conditional domain are *particles*.[15] This is illustrated by the fact that five out of the eight contributions to this volume deal with particles. In general, many of the different kinds of particles found around the world's languages do not have any influence on the truth conditions of a sentence but, rather, impose appropriateness conditions on their use. For instance, modal particles in German have been regarded as conveying non-truth-conditional meaning since the earlier functional studies (Helbig 1977; Weydt 1969) and even in a formal semantics framework, there are some early attempts to relate them to use-conditional meaning (Kratzer 1999). German modal particles are a small, more or less closed set of specific lexical items that convey information about the discourse participants' beliefs and attitudes towards the propositional content. For instance, in rough approximation, *wohl* expresses that the speaker merely assumes that the propositional content is true and *ja* roughly conveys that the hearer may already know the proposition.[16]

(21) a. Hein ist **wohl** auf See.
          Hein is MP *at sea*
          '(As I assume) Hein is at sea.'   (Zimmermann 2004: 543)

      b. Webster schläft **ja**.
          Webster sleeps MP
          '(As you may know) Webster sleeps.'   (Kratzer 1999: 4)

Like expressive attributive adjectives or epithets, modal particles are expletive UCIs, as they are optional and leaving them out does not alter a sentence's truth condition. That is, all the variants in (22) are true iff Webster is sleeping regardless of what kind of attitude is conveyed by the modal particles.

(22) Webster schläft $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \emptyset \\ \text{doch} \\ \text{halt} \\ \text{ja} \\ \text{wohl} \end{array} \right\}$. 'Webster is sleeping $\emptyset$/MP.'

While all being true if Webster is sleeping, the variants in (22) are, of course, not appropriate in the same contexts. For instance, using *ja* in a context like in (23) in which the hearer cannot reasonably be assumed to have already known what the speaker is telling her renders sentence (23a) infelicitous. In the same context, the utterance becomes felicitous if the modal particle is left out, as shown in (23b).

(23)   [Context: A happy father rushes out of the delivery room]

    a.#Es ist **ja**   ein Mädchen!
     It is MP *a   girl*
     'It's a girl!'

    b. Es ist ein Mädchen!
     It is   a   girl
     'It's a girl!'

Furthermore, modal particles mirror expressive attributive adjectives and epithets insofar as they are not saturated and hence not as isolated as the interjections discussed in the previous section. What distinguishes modal particles from the attributive use of *damn* and the like is that they take the entire propositional content of the sentence as their argument.[17]

(24)   Webster schläft ja = $\dfrac{\text{ja(Webster is sleeping)}}{\text{Webster is sleeping}}$

Modal particles exhibit a lot of interesting syntactic and semantic features and, as I argued elsewhere (Gutzmann 2009, 2012), many of them can plausibly be derived from their use-conditional character. The contributions to this volume by Döring (2013), Egg (2013), and Repp (2013) all address various issues connected with this class of particles.

Of course, German modal particles are not the only class of use-conditional particles. There are far too many cases to go through all of them here. But for two further examples, consider the following Japanese particles

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[17] This is, however, arguably also possible for expressive adjectives like *damn*, even if they still take a DP as their argument in the syntax.

(i)   I've spilled that damn bottle again.

The most natural reading of (i) is one in which the speaker has a negative emotion regarding his spilling of the bottle, not regarding the bottle or bottles in general.
   Note that there are usages of some modal particles that syntactically seem to take a more narrow scope over a DP.

(ii)   der wohl größte Bankenskandal aller Zeiten
    the MP *biggest bank.scandal   of.all time*

which are studied by Sudo (2013) [this volume] and McCready & Takahashi (2013) [this volume] respectively.

(25) *Japanese particles*

    a. ima ame futteru **no?**
       now rain is.falling PART
       'Is it raining now?'

    b. A: dooshite ookikunat-tara pairotto-ni naritai   no?
         *why   get.big-when pilot-*ACC *want.become* Q
        'Why do you want to be a pilot when you grow up?'

       B: datte,   kakkoii **mono.**
         come.on cool   MONO
        'Well, because it's cool.'

In his contribution, Sudo (2013) [this volume] discusses the Japanese question particle *no* in polar questions. Adding the particle changes the bias involved in a positive polar question entirely, but not its truth-conditional content. While the positive polar question without a particle does not presuppose any positive evidence, using *no* imposes such a requirement on a felicitous utterance of the question.[18]

(26) *Positive polar questions with* -no

    a. *Neutral Context:* We're looking for a left-handed person. I'm wondering about John, who is not around.

      #John-wa hidarikiki-na **no?**
      *John-*TOP *lefty-*COP   Q
      'Is John lefty?'

    b. *Negative Context:* My friend has just entered our windowless office wearing a dripping wet raincoat.

      #ima hareteru **no?**
      now sunny   Q
      'Is it sunny now?'

    c. *Positive Context:* Same context as (26b).

      ima ame futteru **no?**
      now rain is.falling Q
      'Is it raining now?'

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[18] This can be related to the bias induced by "rising declaratives" (Gunlogson 2003).

Another case of a Japanese particle that conveys non-truth-conditional content is *mono*, illustrated in (25b) and examined in the paper by McCready & Takahashi (2013) [this volume]. As they argue, *mono* is a mixed UCI that conventionally contributes truth-conditional as well as use-conditional content. At the truth-conditional tier, it has the meaning of a causal connective, roughly equivalent to English *because*. In addition, it carries the use-conditional content that the speaker is not neutral about the propositional content expressed by the proposition *mono* attaches to, but that she is personally affected by it. In this respect, *mono* resembles Grice's (1975) decomposition of *therefore* into a conjunctive and causal part.

2.3. *Pronouns*

UCIs are not only attested in the specialized class of particles. Besides expressive adjectives and nouns, which are almost always expressives in the narrow sense, pronouns can also carry non-truth-conditional meaning in many languages. The prototypical example of pronouns that have a use-conditional function can be found in languages that have a distinction between formal and familiar pronouns. This is, amongst many others, the case in German and French.

(27) *Formal vs. familiar pronouns*

    a. Ich rufe **dich**/**Sie**   an.
        I   *call* *you*.FAMILIAR/FORMAL *on*
        'I'll give you a call.'   (Potts 2007c: 190)

    b. **Tu**   es / **Vous**   êtes soûl.
        you.FAMILIAR *are* / *you*.FORMAL *are drunk*
        'You are drunk.'   (Horn 2007: 49)

Like expressively-coloured nouns, such pronouns are mixed UCIs. On the truth-conditional layer, their meaning is just their referent, that is, the addressee of the context in this case. Hence, they cannot be dropped entirely as expletive UCIs. The distinction between *formal* and *familiar* resides on the use-conditional layer. Choosing the wrong pronoun can never make an otherwise true sentence false, but it may result in a high degree of social infelicity.

(28) du = $\dfrac{\text{informal relationship between speaker and hearer}}{\text{the addressee}}$

Another case of personal pronouns contributing use-conditional meaning are free personal dative pronouns that can have a use-conditional function in some languages. For English, Horn (2008; 2013 [this volume]) argues that

dative pronouns may have such an UC-use like in (29a). Other languages which have a more systematic system of free datives, like German (Gutzmann 2007; Lambert 2007; Wegener 1989) or Hebrew (Borer & Grodzinsky 1986), exhibit a pattern known as *ethical dative*.

(29) *Personal datives*

    a. I want **me** an iPod.   (Horn 2008: 175)

    b. Dass du **mir**   JA nicht zu spät kommst.
       that you me.DAT MP *not too late come*
       'Don't you be late.'   (Lambert 2007: 5)

    c. hem kol ha-zman mitxatnim **li**
       they all the-time marry to.me
       'They are getting married on me all the time (and it bothers me)'
                              (Borer & Grodzinsky 1986: 179)

Common to these three free personal datives is that they all express some affection of the speaker towards the fact or event described by the sentence. That is, the speaker of (29a) expresses that she is somehow affected by her wanting an iPod. In a similar vein, the speaker (29b) expresses that she has some personal interest in the hearer not being late (Gutzmann 2007: 277). In contrast, the Hebrew ethical dative in (29c) expresses the speaker's negative affection with all the marrying. However, all this is expressed solely in a use-conditional way. The presence of the personal datives does not alter the truth-conditional content of the sentence. They are all instances of expletive UCIs and could be dropped without any change in grammaticality or truth-conditional meaning.

(30)   I want **me** an iPod $= \dfrac{\text{I am affected by wanting an iPod}}{\text{I want an iPod}}$

Like modal particles, the free datives are not isolated since they take the propositional content of the sentence as their argument.

3. UCIs BEYOND AND BELOW THE WORD LEVEL

Up to this point, every UCI we have presented has been a single word. However, there are also use conditions beyond and below the word level. By this, I mean use-conditional content that stems from intonation, syntactic constructions, morphological operations, the pragmatics of speech acts, or even from orthographic devices.[19] All the examples I discuss in the following

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[19] Another source for use-conditional meaning may be speech-accompanying gestures

show that the phenomenon of use-conditional content is widespread and not restricted to some fancy words. In fact, it pervades every layer of natural language.

3.1. *Use-Conditional Intonation*

Intonation may be one of the most prominent and obvious means of conveying use-conditional meaning.[20] By intonation, one can express all kinds of emotions and attitudes, ranging from joy to anger, interest and boredom.[21] Furthermore, intonation can be used to signal special communicative functions, like irony, sarcasm, or hyperbole, that may guide the pragmatic interpretation of a sentence. Used to indicate emotions or other rhetorical means, intonation is said to be paralinguistic, as it sits on top of the ordinary linguistic signs without being a sign in itself. However, there are cases in which intonation actually is a genuine part of the language system and is reflected in the structure of grammatical constructions and their semantic interpretation. For instance, intonation has linguistic impact in focus-sensitive constructions. A focus particle like *only* associates with an accented expression yielding different readings for different placements of the focus accent.

(31)   a.   Piet only wears a PINK tie at work.
       b.   Piet only wears a pink tie at WORK.

While (31a) is falsified if Piet wears a non-pink tie to work, (31b) allows Piet to wear any tie at work as long as he does not wear a pink tie anywhere else than at work. Different accents lead to different semantic interpretations. Focus-sensitive construction like these are, by far, the best-studied phenomena in which intonation cannot be merely paralinguistic but must be reflected in the syntactic or semantic representation of a sentence. However, there is still some dispute on which meaning-level the difference between (31a) and (31b) is located.[22] Some of the various approaches to the meaning of

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(Ebert et al. 2011). Interestingly, many UCIs share important properties of gestures, for instance the nondisplaceability which is typical of gestural communication; cf. the discussion below in Section 5.2.

   [20] Cf. for instance Ladd (1990), who reviews earlier work by Bolinger. "[T]he unifying idea of B's work is [...] the general claim that intonational features, including accent placement, are beyond grammar and are directly linked to emotion." (Ladd 1990: 806)

   [21] For an overview over the linguistic encoding of emotions, cf. Fries 2007, 2009. For general considerations regarding the role of emotion in language, cf. Jay & Janschewitz's (2007) reply to Potts 2007c.

   [22] For approaches to the syntax and semantics of focus sensitive particles and various

focus are couched in use-conditional rather than truth-conditional terms. For instance, Kratzer (2004) proposes that what seems like the presupposition of the backgrounded material may in fact be rendered more adequately as use-conditional meaning. In his contribution on the expression of surprise, Zeevat (2013) [this volume] argues for an analysis that combines elements from presuppositional and use-conditional approaches, and tries to derive the main properties of focus particles like *only* from their emotive component. In any case, it is clear that, in the absence of any focus-sensitive expression, the focus accent does not contribute truth-conditional content but, rather, influences the conditions on the felicity of an utterance. This is most obvious in the case of question-answer pairs.

(32)   A: Who likes Bruce?
          B: #Rachel likes BRUCE.
          B':   RACHEL likes Bruce.

In the context of the question in (32), an utterance of (32) is infelicitous since it bears the focus accent at a given constituent (Schwarzschild 1999). If the accent pattern is changed to the expected one in (32B'), the sentence can be felicitously uttered.

Besides the use conditions imposed by focus accentuation, there are some other cases of intonation that—unlike the patterns signaling delight or sarcasm, for instance—show some reflections in the grammar. Take, for instance, the intonation pattern that can be called exclamative or *unexpectedness* intonation (Castroviejo Miró 2008) that is typical for exclamative sentences across different languages (d'Avis 2002; Rett 2008; Zanuttini & Portner 2003).

(33)   *Exclamative or unexpectedness intonation*

          a.   How TALL Michael is!
          b.   Wie GROß Michael ist!

Exclamative sentences like these express that the speaker is surprised or astonished about the degree of Michael's height. That unexpectedness intonation ("UI" henceforth) is really part of the language system of English and German is not only shown by the fact that its realization is very constant from a phonological point of view (Oppenrieder 1989), but that it is

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focus sensitive constructions, cf. amongst many others, Altmann 1976; Beaver & Clark 2008; Büring & Hartmann 2001; Jacobs 1983; Horn 1969, 1996; König 1991; Kratzer 2004; Rooth 1985, 1992; Schmitz 2008; Sudhoff 2010.

also directly reflected in their grammars. They are introduced by a word
or phrase which usually introduces a question and therefore licenses the
inversion of the subject and the verb in (standard) main clauses.

(34) a. How tall is Michael?
      b. Wie groß ist Michael?

In *how*-exclamatives however, no inversion takes place. Rather they look like
embedded questions. Without unexpectedness intonation, the sentences
become ungrammatical as they are either exclamatives lacking the needed
intonation or questions lacking the needed inversion.[23]

(35) a. *How tall Michael is.   (without UI)
      b. *Wie groß Michael ist.   (without UI)

What is special about *how*-exclamatives is that they only have use-condi-
tional meaning but no truth-conditional content. Utterances like (33) are
not a statement about or an assertion of Michael's height. For instance, they
cannot serve as an answer to a query about Michael's height. In contrast, an
assertion that Michael has a surprisingly high degree of tallness is perfectly
fine.

(36) A: How tall is Michael?
      B1: #How tall Michael is!
      B2: Surprisingly tall.

Furthermore, the unexpectedness is also not part of the truth-conditional
content. This is shown by the fact that it can neither be denied nor even
affirmed.

(37) A: How tall Michael is!
      B1: #That's not true. I don't think this is unexpected at all.
      B2: #You're completely right. That is unexpected.

In *how*-exclamatives, no truth-conditional content seems to be left behind.
If this is the case, there would be an empty lower level in the informal
fraction notation.

(38) How tall Michael is! $= \dfrac{\text{It is unexpected how tall Michael is}}{\emptyset}$

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[23] Of course, both sentences are grammatical, if they are interpreted as a special kind
of question, for instance as a kind of deliberative or reflective question or as an echoic
clarification question. Furthermore, both sentences are possible in book titles or the like,
in which case they are akin to embedded questions.

This raises the question of whether UI or the corresponding semantic operator it realizes is different from all the other UCIs presented so far. If it is, then UI is a new kind of expressive insofar as it affects the truth-conditional content. Informally, it takes its truth-conditional argument with it to the use-conditional layer and does not leave it, unlike all the other UCIs. In a paper on various kinds of use-conditional content, McCready (2010) calls such items *shunting* UCIs. However, it might be the case that the impression that *how*-exclamatives have no truth-conditional content is only superficial. An argument for this comes from exclamatives that have a more declarative structure instead of being introduced by *how* (Castroviejo Miró 2008).

(39)   Obama won the Nobel Prize!

In contrast to *how*-exclamatives, declarative exclamatives can be used to assert their propositional content.

(40)   A: What happened?
       B: Obama won the Nobel Prize!

Like in *how*-exclamatives, UI is not part of the truth-conditional content of a declarative exclamative either. That is, they do not make an assertion about the speaker's attitude regarding the propositional content.

(41)   A: How do you feel about Obama's current situation?
       B1:   #He won the Nobel Prize!
       B2:   I'm surprised that he won the Nobel Prize.

The behavior of UI in declarative exclamatives thus parallels that of other expletives like modal particles, and accordingly, there are two levels of meaning involved in declarative exclamatives.

(42)   Obama won the Nobel Prize! =

$$\frac{\text{It is unexpected that Obama won the Nobel Prize}}{\text{Obama won the Nobel Prize}}$$

Given this analysis of declarative exclamatives, it can be argued that UI does makes the same contribution in *how*-exclamatives. That the latter cannot be used to assert anything must then follow from the fact that their truth-conditional content corresponds to a question meaning and is thus not suitable for being asserted. For an elaboration of this argument and a formalization, see Castroviejo Miró (2008), from whom I have borrowed the arguments in this short discussion.[24]

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[24] From the conclusion that UI is not a shunting UCI, it does not, of course, follow that there are no such items, cf. Section 4 below.

Another kind of intonation that does not alter the truth-conditional content of a sentence and which could be analyzed as contributing use-conditional content is *verum focus*. As coined by Höhle (1992), the term *verum focus* refers to a special kind of non-contrastive focus in German that is realized on the finite verb or a complementizer, both located in C in German. Informally, the contribution of verum focus is that it puts emphasis on the propositional content it scopes over.

(43) *Verum focus*

    A: Peter is supposed to have written a book.
    B: Peter HAT ein Buch geschrieben.
       Peter has a   book written
       'Peter has indeed written a book.'   (Höhle 1992)

Höhle (1992: 112) assumes that verum focus is a means to realize a semantic operator he calls VERUM. The working paraphrase he uses as the meaning of the verum operator in his paper (Höhle 1992: 112) is simply that of a matrix sentence that states that the embedded proposition is true.

VERUM is not restricted to German. Cross-linguistically, it can be realized in many different ways. As we have seen, VERUM is realized by verum focus in German. In contrast, both in English and in Spanish, we find special kinds of lexical insertions to instantiate the verum operator (Gutzmann & Castroviejo Miró 2011).

(44) A: I wonder whether Carl has finished his book.
    B1: Karl HAT sein Buch beendet.   (German → verum focus in C)
    B2: Carl **did** finish his book.   (English → *do* insertion)
    B3: Carlos **sí** acabó su libro.   (Spanish → *sí* insertion)

The verum operator realized by these different constructions behaves like other expletive UCIs as it does not alter the truth-conditional content of the sentence. All the answers in (44) are true if the person in question has finished his book. The contribution of VERUM is in the use-conditional layer. Its argument is the propositional content of the sentence.

(45) Carl did finish his book $\approx \dfrac{\text{It is true that Carl finished his book}}{\text{Carl finished his book}}$

Things are not that straightforward with VERUM since it is also possible in a variety of non-declarative sentence types (cf. Höhle 1992 for an overview). This brings up the interesting question of how VERUM interacts with the sentence mood of the different sentence types in which it is allowed. For instance, in a polar question with VERUM (Romero 2005; Romero & Han 2004), the use-conditional meaning of the interrogative cannot simply be that the content of the question is true, as in (47).

(46) *Verum focus in polar question*   (Höhle 1992: 112)

  A: I have heard that Carl kicked the dog.
  B: HAT er den Hund denn getreten?
     has   he the dog   MP   kicked?
     'HAS he kicked the dog?'

(47) HAS he kicked the dog? $\neq$ $\dfrac{\text{Is true that he kicked the dog?}}{\text{Has he kicked the dog?}}$

Verum focus and VERUM are therefore an interesting subject to study the interaction between UCIs and sentence mood.[25] Furthermore, as a means of information structure, verum focus is governed by the discourse structure and can therefore also provide insights into the dynamics of use-conditional meaning. In her detailed study on the discourse function of verum focus, Repp (2013) [this volume] shows that VERUM interacts in delicate ways not only with the information structure of a sentence, but also with modal operators, negation, and modal particles.

I have used unexpectedness intonation and verum focus as two phenomena of intonation that conventionally express use-conditional content. However, there are certainly many others. Arguably, the alternative invoking function of ordinary information focus could be understood as being use-conditional. Only if there are focus sensitive operators like *only* present in the sentence, does it have an impact on the truth-conditional content of a sentence. See Zeevat's (2013) [this volume] contribution for elaboration.

3.2. *Use-Conditional Syntax*

Besides intonation, another way to alter the use conditions of a sentence without affecting its truth-conditional content is by using certain, often non-canonical syntactic structures. Many of those are associated with specific functions of information structuring which commonly have no influence on the truth conditions of a sentence.

Of the syntactic constructions that do not affect the truth conditions of a sentence, non-restrictive relative clauses as in (48a) and other supplements like *as*-appositives (48b), nominal appositives (48c), and parentheticals (48d) are the most prominent ones in the literature on multidimensionality in semantics (Jayez & Rossari 2004; Nouwen 2007; Potts 2002, 2005).

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[25] Sentence mood itself has been argued to contribute use-conditional content. See Stenius 1967 for an early outline, and Portner 2007 or Gutzmann 2012 for more recent implementations.

(48)   *Appositives & parentheticals*

    a. Ames, **who was a successful spy**, is now behind bars.   (Potts 2005: 90)
    b. Ames was, **as the press reported**, a successful spy.
    c. Ames, **a former spy**, is now behind bars.
    d. Ames—**and you will never believe this**—is now behind bars.

All these kinds of unintegrated syntactic supplements are semantically independent of the rest of the sentence. Using them leads to a very intuitive form of semantic multidimensionality as there are two sentences presented as one. The contents of these two sentences are transparently distinct from each other, except for the anchor of the supplement.

(49)   Ames, a former spy, is now behind bars $= \dfrac{\text{Ames is a former spy}}{\text{Ames is now behind bars}}$

However, even if all the phenomena in (48) involve straight multidimensionality, they differ crucially from other UCIs. In contrast to them, it is not obvious that supplements convey conventional non-truth-conditional content. Instead, it is reasonable to assume that they primarily have truth-conditional content. While it may be mistaken in the first place to ask what the truth conditions for the interjection *ouch* or the modal particle *ja* are, this is an easy question when it comes to appositives and their kin. For a supplement, we can easily give the truth conditions if it is applied to its anchor. For instance, the content of the nominal appositive *a former spy* combined with its anchor *Ames* is given by the top layer in (49). Obviously, this is true, if Ames is a former spy. In the same vein, the *as*-appositive in (48b) is true, if the press reported that Ames was a successful spy. That is, what we have on the top layer in (49) is truth-conditional rather than use-conditional. This is also shown by the possibility of denying the content of an appositive, even if doing this is not as straightforward as for the primary, asserted content.

(50)   A: Ames, **a former spy**, is now behind bars.
     B: Yes, however, he was not a spy but a corrupted politician.

However, the truth-conditional content of the supplement is independent of the truth-conditional content at the lower level. We can judge whether it is true that Ames was a former spy independently of the question of whether he is now behind bars, and *vice versa*. Informally, we can thus give the following truth conditions for (48c).

(51) $\dfrac{\text{Ames was a former spy}}{\text{Ames is now behind bars}} = \dfrac{\text{true, iff Ames was a former spy}}{\text{true, iff Ames is now behind bars}}$

That is, even if appositives and other syntactic supplements express truth-conditional instead of use-conditional content, they mirror expletive UCIs

insofar as they convey their content independently of the content of the main clause, thereby leading to multidimensional content.

There are other syntactic constructions that, unlike the supplements in (48), are more likely to contribute use-conditional instead of truth-conditional content. Take, for instance, topicalization (Birner & Ward 1998; Frey 2010).

(52)   *Topicalization*

John, Mary loves.

Whatever the exact use conditions imposed by topicalization may be,[26] it is clear that they do not have any influence on the truth conditions of the sentence, which are the same as the truth conditions of the corresponding sentence with canonical word order. That is, both (53a) and (53b) are true if Mary loves John.

(53)   a. John, Mary loves.
       b. Mary loves John.

The use-conditional contribution of topicalization has to be given in information structural terms. Of course, giving a paraphrase for such functions means leaving aside many of the details of the use conditions for topics. But for the sake of illustration, let us adopt Portner's (2007: 418) formulation that the speaker's "mental representation" of the topical element is active. We thus have the following truth and use conditions for (52):

(54)   John, Mary loves $= \dfrac{\text{The speaker's mental representation of John is active}}{\text{Mary loves John}}$

That the contribution of topicalization puts such a requirement on the discourse context can be illustrated by the following examples.

(55)   [Rushing into the room:]
       #John, Mary loves.

(56)   A: What's up with Mary?
       B: #John, Mary loves.

In (55), there is a neutral context in which there is nothing active in the mental representation. In (56), A asks a question about Mary and thereby activates B's mental representation of Mary but not of John. Therefore, topicalizing *John* is infelicitous in such contexts.

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[26] Büring (1997, 2003), for instance, provides accounts of topics in general, relating them to the management of the question under discussion. For various use-conditional ways to manage the common ground, cf. Repp 2013 [this volume].

That the semantics of topicalization behave very differently from that of appositives can be shown by trying to deny them, as in (50) for appositives. As expected, this is impossible as it is for the other UCIs.

(57) A: John, Mary loves.
     B: #Yes, but I haven't thought about John.

Apart from topicalization, there are many more non-canonical syntactic constructions that may be used to expressively convey something about the discourse role of a moved constituent, like right and left dislocation or "free-topic" constructions in German (cf. e.g., Altmann 1981). The so-called *pre-prefield* in German, i.e., the position before the ordinary first position before the main verb in non-subordinated clauses, seems to be systematically associated with the function of framing and integrating the truth-conditional content of the sentence into the discourse structure, thereby affecting the use conditions of the utterance.

3.3. *Use-Conditional Morphology*

The UCIs discussed so far are all lexical words or—in case of intonation of syntactic constructions conventionally associated with UC-meaning—something beyond or above the word level. But use conditions can also be imposed below the word level on a regular basis, as many languages employ a subsystem that may be called *expressive morphology* (Bauer 1997; Stump 1993; Zwicky & Pullum 1987).[27] Even if use-conditional morphology, as I prefer to call it, is "associated with an expressive, playful, poetic, or simply ostentatious effect of some kind" (Zwicky & Pullum 1987), it is still part of the language system, as it is governed by regularities, even if the rules for use-conditional morphology may differ from what Zwicky & Pullum (1987) call *plain morphology*. In the following, I will present a small selection of the phenomena that can be found in this huge terrain. To keep the presentation focused, I will concentrate on use-conditional phenomena in the morphology of German (cf. Dressler & Merlini-Barbaresi 1994 for an overview).

One kind of phenomenon of use-conditional morphology that is common across many languages is expressive derivation. In particular, diminutive suffixes are capable of conveying affective, use-conditional meaning when used with expressions referring to persons. For instance, there is systematic usage of the suffix *-i* in German to derive affective nicknames from ordinary proper names.

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[27] Alternative notions are *evaluative* or *affective morphology*.

(58) *Expressive diminutives*

> Guten Morgen, Hans-**i**
> *good morning Hans*-DIM.FAMILIAR
> 'Good morning, Hans.'

Like the familiar second-person pronoun *du* discussed in (27), the suffix *-i* expresses a familiar relationship. In contrast with the pronoun, this relationship does not necessarily involve the speaker and the addressee but the speaker and the referent of the stem to which the suffix attaches.[28] The expression of familiarity does not alter the truth conditions of a sentence. But, unlike the familiar pronoun *du*, expressive *-i* arguably has no truth-conditional content at all. Accordingly, we can give the following representation for *-i* suffixed to a proper name like *Hans*.

(59) Hans-i = $\dfrac{\text{familiar relationship between the speaker and Hans}}{\text{Hans}}$

Another instance of use-conditional morphology as discussed in the paper by Bücking & Rau (2013) [this volume] is a morpho-syntactic construction involving non-inflected verbal stems. These verb forms can be used—primarily in electronic chat or forum texts—to transform the meaning of the verbal stem into a kind of performative. For instance, the verb stem *grins*-'smile' in (60a) counts as a substitute for performing the act of smiling.

(60) *Non-inflected verbs*

> a. **grins**
> *smile*.STEM

> b. dich in den Arm **nehm**
> *you*.ACC *in the arm take*.STEM

As in (60b), such non-inflected verbs need not to be bare forms, but can also take further arguments. That shows that it is not a purely morphological phenomenon. Interestingly, it can take the same arguments as its inflected forms.[29] That is, both constructions in (60) are used by the speaker to substitute for the action expressed by the construction in a remote conversation,

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[28] Of course, this still may be the addressee as in (58), where *-i* is affixed to the vocatively used proper name *Hans*.

[29] The subject is an exception, as it is hardly ever realized, which Bücking & Rau (2013) [this volume] show in their paper. In this respect, the non-inflected constructions mirror infinitives, to which the authors relate them. For a thorough treatment of (adult) "root infinitives," and speculations on why adding a "subject" to them leads to directive interpretations only, see Reis 1995, 2003; Truckenbrodt 2006a, 2006b; or Gärtner (2013).

namely, that the speaker is smiling or hugging the addressee. Using the terminology introduced so far, the constructions are *shunting* UCIs like the unexpectedness intonation discussed above, since they do no leave behind any truth-conditional content. The following representation illustrates the dimensions of meaning involved in these non-inflected verbal constructions.

(61)   dich in den Arm nehm =

$$\frac{\text{the speaker is acting as if performing the action of hugging the addressee}}{\emptyset}$$

Of course, use-conditional morphology encompasses much more than the two phenomena just sketched. For an overview of more and different use-conditional elements in morphology, see Dressler & Merlini-Barbaresi 1994; Fortin 2011; Zwicky & Pullum 1987.

4. Types of Use-Conditional Items

In the preceding survey of UCIs from different categories, I introduced some distinctions regarding which levels of meaning a UCI contributes to and how it interacts with the truth-conditional content. In this section, I will summarize these findings and establish some terminology for talking about these distinctions.

As we saw in the overview, there are at least two binary dimensions with respect to which UCIs may differ and therefore, we can distinguish at least five different types of UCIs. The first distinction concerns the question of whether a UCI has only use-conditional content or whether it carries truth-conditional meaning as well. I call this criterion *dimensionality*. A UCI that only conveys UC-meaning is said to be one-dimensional, whereas an expression that contributes both kinds of meaning is two-dimensional. I will render this as the binary feature $[\pm 2\text{-}dimensional]$, or $[\pm 2d]$ for short. As I have done in the previous subsections, I call UCIs that are $[-2\text{-}dimensional]$, i.e. UCIs that contribute only use-conditional but no truth-conditional content, *expletive* UCIs, following Cruse (2004: 57). In order to denote UCIs that contribute content to both dimensions of meaning, I adopt the term *mixed* UCIs from McCready (2010). These are specified as $[+2\text{-}dimensional]$. Amongst others, examples of expletive UCIs have been expressive adjective attributes, (cf. (2)), modal particles (cf. (21)), or the discourse structuring effect of topicalization (cf. (52)). Removing or adding these to a sentence does not affect its truth-conditional content, since they convey only use-conditional meaning. Mixed UCIs, on the other hand, also express content

that is truth-contentionally relevant. They include ethnic slurs (cf. (10)), which contribute truth-conditional content that equals that of their neutral, non-racist counterparts. The familiar/formal pronouns *du/tous* vs. *Sie/vous* (cf. (27)) are a further case of mixed UCIs. They refer to the addressee at the truth-conditional tier, while expressing a familiar or formal relationship between speaker and addressee at the use-conditional one.

The feature of dimensionality is, however, not sufficient to account for all differences that can be attested between various UCIs. For instance, we have seen that the use-conditional component of interjections behaves differently than that of modal particles for instance, even if both are expletive UCIs. Likewise, amongst mixed UCIs, the use-conditional content of ethnic slurs behaves differently from the content conveyed by the mixed UCI *man* when used with a gradable adjective inside the sentence. These differences do not concern what content a UCI delivers but what it needs. Interjections and ethnic slurs have use-conditional content that comes already saturated. By this, I mean that they do not need any further argument to unfold their meaning; that is, they come with complete use conditions and are not any kind of function from (an) argument(s) to use conditions. As illustrated in (8), the interjection *ouch* directly expresses the emotion of pain without needing an argument. The same holds for the slur *Kraut* in (17). The negative attitude it expresses towards Germans does not depend on any argument, even if it needs an argument in the truth-conditional dimension.

By contrast, other UCIs seek an argument to which their content can apply. For example, modal particles like *ja* display an attitude towards a propositional argument, and expressive adjectival attributes like *damn* express an attitude towards a nominal argument. This is informally described in (4) and (24). This is the second aspect with respect to which UCIs can differ, which I call their *functionality*. I use the binary feature [±*functional*], or [±*f*], to distinguish what I label *isolated* UCIs (after Potts 2005: 65) from *functional* UCIs.

Given the two binary features of dimensionality and functionality, we can distinguish at least four different types of UCIs. However, this is a simplification since I have left out of the picture those expressions that I have called *shunting UCIs* (McCready 2010). Those are functional UCIs that do not leave their truth-conditional argument unmodified in the truth-conditional dimension like functional expletive UCIs do. Instead, they shunt their argument over to the use-conditional dimension. Unexpectedness intonation, as discussed in (33), could be understood as an example of a shunting UCI. McCready (2010) discusses the Japanese adverbial *yokumo*, which transfers an assertion into a use-conditional speech act of negative

attitude and unexpectedness. Finally, as argued by Bücking & Rau (2013), [this volume] the non-inflected constructions discussed above only contribute use-conditional meaning, too. Since both functional expletives and shunting UCIs need an argument and contribute only to the use-conditional dimension, they have the same features. Therefore, we need an additional feature to distinguish between functional UCIs that shunt and those that do not. Because, as McCready (2010) points out, shunting UCIs consume their argument whereas functional expletives do not, which means that it can be reused in a semantic derivation, we can use resource-sensitivity [$\pm$*r-sensitive*], or [$\pm$*rs*] as a distinguishing feature.[30] However, this feature only makes sense for one-dimensional functional UCIs. On the one hand, isolated UCIs do not take any argument and therefore, the question whether an application is resource-sensitive or not does not arise. On the other hand, functional mixed UCIs always map their argument to both dimensions of meaning and hence, we cannot meaningfully distinguish between two variants of functional mixed UCIs.[31] Taking the distinction between expletive and shunting functional UCIs, we end up with five different types of UCI. Table 1 gives the matrix for the different kinds of UCIs and provides a label for each type.

Table 1: Types of use-conditional items

	f	*2d*	*rs*
isolated expletive UCIs	–	–	
isolated mixed UCIs	–	+	
functional UCIs, expletive	+	–	–
shunting	+	–	+
functional mixed UCIs	+	+	

Depending on their feature structure, these five types of UCIs can be ordered hierarchically. The simplest type are isolated expletive UCIs as they have a negative specification for dimensionality and functionality. The next level of complexity consists of both functional UCIs and isolated mixed UCIs. These two structures cannot be related to each other, since they are derived from isolated expletives by the addition of a different feature. In the case of

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[30] Resource-sensitivity figures prominently in linear logic (Girard 1987) and has been adopted in certain varieties of natural language semantics (Asudeh 2005; Barker 2010).

[31] In one sense, functional mixed UCIs are [+*r-sensitive*], because they do not give back their argument unmodified. In another sense, they are [–*r-sensitive*], since their argument appears in both dimensions.

Fig. 1. Relations between the five types of use-conditional items

functional UCIs, there is a positive specification for being functional, in contrast to isolated expletives. Here, we can distinguish between shunting and expletive functional UCIs, depending on the specification for resource-sensitivity. When a positive specification for dimensionality is added to the simple case of isolated expletives, we arrive at isolated mixed UCIs. Functional mixed UCIs, the fifth and most feature-rich type, share one feature with each functional and isolated mixed UCIs. We can arrive from the latter two types at functional mixed UCIs if we add the feature that they are missing. Figure 1 illustrates the relations between the five types of UCIs with respect to their feature structure.

When comparing the informal fraction representations I have used throughout this chapter to illustrate the truth- and use-conditional content of sentences containing UCIs, we can abstract a schematic representation for each of the five types of UCIs.

The simplest schema is that for isolated expletives, since they do not interact with the rest of the sentence in any non-trivial way. When an interjection like *ouch* is used together with a sentence, the truth-conditional content of the sentence is not affected by the presence of that interjection, whereas its use-conditional content is given by the emotion conveyed by *ouch* itself. To be a bit more precise, I make use of the following notational conventions. The variable S ranges over sentences, and ε over use-conditional expressions. I use brackets to indicate that something is included in a sentence. That is, $S[\dots\varepsilon\dots]$ denotes a sentence that includes a UCI in an unspecified position. For isolated expletives, we thus arrive at the following schema.

(62) *Schema for isolated expletives*

$$S[...\varepsilon...] = \frac{\varepsilon}{S}$$

From isolated expletives we get to the type of functional expletives by adding the feature [+*functional*]. In contrast to the former, the meaning of the latter is a use-conditional function which, as such, needs an argument, for which I use the variable α. A functional expletive UCI, like the adjective *damn* for instance, needs a nominal argument to which the negative attitude conveyed can apply. Not all functional UCIs modify their argument at the truth-conditional layer. However, depending on whether the application is [−*resource-sensitive*] or not, we have to distinguish between two schemas for functional UCIs. Functional expletives like *damn* pass their argument back to the truth-conditional layer. Truth-conditionally, *the damn dog* makes the same contribution as *the dog*. Therefore, the argument α has to show up at the lower level of the fraction representation in addition to being the argument for the UCI at the use-conditional layer on top of it.

(63) *Schema for expletive functional UCIs*

$$S[...\varepsilon(\alpha)...] = \frac{\varepsilon(\alpha)}{S[...\alpha...]}$$

This contrasts with the schema for shunting functional UCIs, for which the application is [+*resource-sensitive*], because their argument is not reused at the truth-conditional level. Therefore, the shunting application removes the argument α from the truth-conditional tier.

(64) *Schema for shunting functional UCIs*

$$S[...\varepsilon(\alpha)...] = \frac{\varepsilon(\alpha)}{S}$$

The difference between functional UCIs and isolated mixed UCIs is that the former contribute only to the use-conditional meaning component, whereas isolated mixed UCIs carry also truth-conditionally relevant meaning; they are [+*2-dimensional*]. However, the use-conditional component of isolated mixed UCIs is [−*functional*] since it does not depend on an argument. An ethnic slur like *Kraut*, for instance, descriptively predicates *German* to a nominal argument α while expressing a negative attitude towards Germans in the use-conditional dimension. To indicate the 2-dimensionality of a UCI, I make use of subscripted t and u to label the truth- and use-conditional content of a mixed expressive. Since the negative attitude conveyed by *Kraut* does not need an argument at the truth-conditional tier, the argument α does not show up at the top layer of the following representational schema for isolated mixed UCIs:

(65) *Schema for isolated mixed UCIs*

$$S[...\varepsilon(\alpha)...] = \frac{\varepsilon_u}{S[...\varepsilon_t(\alpha)...]}$$

The last type, functional mixed UCIs, differs from the last two types insofar as it is both [+*functional*] and [+*2-dimensional*]. The use-conditional component of a functional mixed UCI is a use-conditional function and therefore needs an argument α. And since it has mixed content, such an item contributes something to the truth-conditional dimension as well. An example of a functional mixed UCI is given by the interjectional use of English *man* when combined with a sentence that contains a gradable adjective. On the truth-conditional layer, *man* intensifies the property predicated in the propositional content, i.e., *Man, it's hot!* means that it is very hot (McCready 2009). On the use-conditional layer, *man* expresses that the speaker is somehow affected by that high degree of heat. The schema for functional mixed UCIs hence involves an argument α that is present in both dimensions of meaning. In the truth-conditional tier, it is modified by ε_t, the truth-conditional meaning component of the mixed expressive, while on the use-conditional level on top of it, α serves as the argument for the use-conditional content ε_u.

(66) *Schema for functional mixed UCIs*

$$S[...\varepsilon(\alpha)...] = \frac{\varepsilon_u(\alpha)}{S[...\varepsilon_t(\alpha)...]}$$

These five schemas are useful for illustrating the differences and similarities between the four types of UCIs. They could serve as a good starting point for anyone aiming to develop a formal model for dealing with UCIs.

5. CHARACTERISTICS OF USE-CONDITIONAL MEANING

So far, I have given an overview of the richness of expressions and constructions that convey use-conditional meaning, and distinguished between four different types of UCIs. However, I have not yet given a description of the main characteristics and properties of expressions that convey use-conditional meaning. That will be the topic of this section.

One feature that ties all UCIs together is trivial insofar as it follows from their definition. UCIs convey meaning that does not contribute to the truth conditions of a sentence, but instead, they affect the conditions in which the sentence can felicitously be uttered. However, even if this is what defines UCIs, one may ask whether there are further properties

common to all UCIs. If there are no additional similarities between the different expressions and constructions sketched in this chapter, would not the notion of UCIs just be an artificial cover term to lump together various phenomena that not really related to each other? This question becomes especially prominent when considering the broad range of phenomena that I have characterized as being use-conditional. Although I will show that there are certain characteristics that are shared by all UCIs, I should briefly address this worry directly.

I think that even if there were no properties common to all UCIs (of course, besides being use-conditional), this should not be considered as problematic. First, when speaking of UCIs, I do not want to presuppose that all expressions that contribute use-conditional instead of truth-conditional content form a natural class of *expressions*. Rather, I would say that use-conditional meaning is a class of *meaning*, just as truth-conditional meaning is another. Secondly, finding common properties in addition to use-conditionality should be considered as a bonus and not as a necessary condition, as it should not even be expected. When considering all expressions that contribute truth-conditional content, it is very hard to find properties that are shared by all of them. For instance, what is a property that verbs, quantifiers like *many*, and conjunctions share? Truth-conditional content is contributed by expressions of a large variety of parts of speech or constructions, yet we speak of truth-conditional expressions. What unites them is that they help to determine the conditions under which a sentence is true. In the same vein, I think that we should not be worried if expressions that convey use-conditional meaning exhibit the same diversity as truth-conditional expressions.

This worry therefore may not be as problematic as it seems, at first sight. And it becomes even less worrying, since there actually are some characteristic properties that are common to UCIs. These, however, follow more or less from the fact that UCIs are not part of the truth conditions of the sentence in which they are used. But this does not make these criteria less useful; quite the contrary. They can be used as a tool to check whether an alleged UCI does indeed contribute use-conditional content rather than just rely on our intuition that it does not affect the truth conditions of an utterance.

In the following, I present and discuss some properties that have been ascribed to UCIs in the literature. I then check how these can be used to test the non-truth-conditionality of an expression that is supposed to contribute use-conditional meaning. As a starting point, I will take the following list of properties that Potts (2007c) suggests as being essential to expressives (in the narrow sense) in his influential paper.

(67) Potts's (2007c) properties of expressives   (Potts 2007c: 166 f.)

    a. Independence
    b. Nondisplaceability
    c. Perspective dependence
    d. Descriptive ineffability
    e. Immediacy
    f. Repeatability

I will now sketch out Potts's (2007c) aims with these properties, and whether they apply to all of the five types of UCIs.

5.1. *Independence*

The most important property on Potts's (2007c) list is that use-conditional content is independent of the truth-conditional content. Here is how Potts (2007c: 166) formulates this property:

(68) **Independence**—Expressive content contributes a dimension of meaning that is separate from the regular truth-conditional content.

The independence of use-conditional from truth-conditional content should directly follow from this distinction. Use-conditional content affects the conditions under which a sentence can be uttered felicitously, not the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to make a sentence true. Hence, using a UCI that is not licensed by the utterance context leads to infelicity, but does not render a sentence false that would be true if the UCI were left out or—in the case of mixed UCIs—were substituted by a non-UCI counterpart (see below). We are dealing with two separate criteria to evaluate a sentence. The independence from the regular truth-conditional content is also what distinguishes use-conditional content from presuppositions, because presupposed content can affect truth-conditional content, at least if it is not satisfied.

    Since independence follows directly from the fact that use-conditional content is not truth-conditional content, it holds for all kinds of UCIs. The first way to test independence is by giving the truth conditions of a sentence that contains an alleged UCI and comparing it with the same sentence without it, or with a sentence containing a different UCI. If the truth conditions are the same, then the content of the UCI in question does not contribute truth-conditional content. I have already employed such a test in the preceding survey to illustrate that an expression does not contribute to the truth conditions of a sentence. In (22) for instance, I gave the truth conditions for an utterance of the sentence *Webster schläft* {∅/*doch/halt/ja/wohl*}, all the variants of which are true, if Webster is sleeping, regardless of whether or

which modal particle is used. As we saw in (23b), modal particles can also be used to illustrate that the use-conditional content of an utterance can lead to infelicity even if its truth-conditional content is true. Since the modal particle *ja* expressively ascribes potential previous knowledge of the truth-conditional content to the addressee, using *ja* in the context of (23) in an utterance of *Es ist ein Mädchen!* "It's a girl!" makes the utterance infelicitous, even if the sentence is still true.

Before I provide some more procedures to use the independence property to derive further characteristics of UCIs, let me add a qualification to this property and Potts's (2007c) formulation of it. Even if Potts (2007c) is right by saying that *use-conditional content* is independent of the truth-conditional content, it is important to keep in mind that it neither generally holds that the *content of a UCI* is independent of the truth-conditional content nor that the truth-conditional content is independent of the content of an expressive. This is so because, as we have seen, there are what I have called mixed UCIs that contribute both, use- as well as truth-conditional content. This is illustrated schematically in (65) and (66). Mixed UCIs like *Kraut* or the German familiar pronoun *du* cannot be omitted from a sentence without also removing their truth-conditional contribution.[32]

Besides giving the truth conditions of a sentence, there are other tests that can be used to argue for the non-truth-conditional status of the content of an expression. The first one involves negation. If an expression contributes truth-conditional content, it should be possible to target that content by ordinary negation. For instance, an ordinary adverb can be negated directly, as (69) shows.

(69) a. Peter is running **fast**.
      b. Peter is not running **fast**.

For the negated sentence to be true, it should not be the case that Peter runs fast. However, that is still compatible with a situation in which Peter runs and therefore, a continuation that states that the rest of the sentence holds, without the negated adverb, is coherent.

(70)   Peter is not running fast, even if he is running.

This contrasts with use-conditional content. Take modal particles again. Even if negation can be used in a sentence containing *ja*, it cannot target

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[32] However, they can be viewed as multidimensional lexical items whose two dimensions of meaning are nonetheless independent.

the modal particle. Consider the following example, which is a negation of
(21b).

(71) Webster schläft **ja** nicht.
      Webster sleeps MP *not*
      '(As you may know) Webster is not sleeping.'

In this example, the negation cannot target *ja*—it has to target the entire
proposition. But crucially *ja* is still not part of the negated proposition but
itself scopes over the entire negated proposition. Therefore, a discourse
continuation that tries to establish the truth of the corresponding sentence
without the negation and the modal particle is not possible. In fact, trying
to do this just leads to a plain contradiction.

(72) #Webster schläft **ja** nicht, auch wenn er schläft.
      Webster sleeps MP *not   even if   he sleeps*
      #'Webster is not *ja* sleeping, even if he is sleeping.'
      (intended: 'As you may not have known, Webster is sleeping.')

A related way to employ negation to test the non-truth-conditionality of
an expression is by denial in dialogue (cf. Jayez & Rossari 2004). Instead of
trying to negate use-conditional content in the same sentence, one can try
to deny it by a reacting utterance in a discourse.

(73) A: Webster schläft **ja**.
            'Webster is *ja* sleeping.'
      B1:   No, he isn't.
      B2:   #No, I didn't know that.
      B3:   #No, even if he is sleeping.

B's answer in (73B1) shows that it is perfectly fine to deny the truth-con-
ditional content that Webster is sleeping. However, (73)-B1 does not say
anything about the contribution of *ja*. The acceptability of (73B1) contrasts
with B's possible reactions in (73B2) and (73B3), which are both infelicitous.
In (73B2), the speaker is trying to deny the use-conditional contribution of *ja*
in A's utterance by negating what A attributed to her by the use of *ja*. This is
infelicitous. The same holds if B tries to negate the use-conditional content
while asserting that the truth-conditional content holds, which is possible
for truth-conditional expressions as shown in (70).

Maybe the infelicity of (73B2) and (73B3) is related to the presence of
the answer particle *no* that seems to inevitably target the truth-conditional
content. When *no* is omitted and B asserts that she did not know what A
has asserted, we get a felicitous utterance in which B, at first sight, seems to
target the knowledge-ascribing content of *ja*.

(74) A: Webster schläft **ja**.
        'Webster is *ja* sleeping.'
      B: I didn't know that.

In this form, B's denial is felicitous. However, it only seems as if B's response is denying the content of *ja*, but in fact, it is not. This is shown by the following dialogue in which B can also assert that she did not know that Webster is sleeping, but A has not even used *ja*.

(75) A: Webster is sleeping.
      B: I didn't know that.

That shows that B's reaction in (74) does not deny the use-conditional content contributed by *ja* but just makes explicit how A's utterance fits into her discourse model, even if her utterance contradicts what is displayed by A's usage of the modal particle.

   Besides negation and denial, there are other tests to show that the meaning of UCIs does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of an utterance. For instance, use-conditional content does not become part of the content of a question. Consider first an example that shows that a truth-conditional expression like *fast* is indeed part of a question.

(76) A: Is Peter running fast?
      B1: No, but he is running.
      B2: #Yes. However, he isn't fast.

As (76)-B1 illustrates, giving a negative answer to A's question is still compatible with Peter running. Furthermore, one cannot give a positive answer to the question without committing to the contribution of *fast*, as shown in (76)-B2. For use-conditional content, it is the other way round. In the following example, B cannot give a negative answer to A's question on the grounds that she rejects only the contribution of the UCI but not the truth-conditional content.

(77) A: Have you ever met that bastard Kresge?
      B1: #No. But I have met him.
      B2: Yes. However, I like him.

The answer in (77)-B2 furthermore shows that committing to the truth-conditional content of a sentence does not commit oneself to the use-conditional content of the preceding question, at least if one makes oneself sufficiently clear.

   That use-conditional meaning is not part of what is questioned by an interrogative and that it can neither be the target of negation nor of denial

in dialogue follows directly from the fact that it contributes a dimension of meaning that is independent from the regular truth-conditional dimension. Hence, I add them as subproperties to the property of (my reformulation of) independence.

(78) **Independence**—Expressive content contributes a dimension of meaning that is separate from the regular truth-conditional content.

> a. Use-conditional content cannot be negated by ordinary negation.
> b. Use-conditional content cannot be denied directly in dialogue.
> c. Use-conditional content is not part of what is questioned by an interrogative.
> d. Use-conditional content does not affect the truth-conditional content if not fulfilled.

These properties can therefore function as diagnostics to establish the independence of the content of an expression. However, they alone are not sufficient to show that an expression contributes use-conditional content since other kinds of meaning, like presuppositions, show the same behavior with respect to negation and questions. The distinction between presupposed and use-conditional content can be motivated in more detail,[33] but as we saw above, the independence holds in both directions for UCIs. While a main characteristic of presuppositions is that the truth-conditional content depends on the satisfaction of its presuppositions, the truth-conditional content is not affected if a UCI is used infelicitously. Therefore, I have added (78d) as a further subproperty of independence.

5.2. *Nondisplaceability*

By saying that use-conditional content is nondisplaceable, Potts (2007c: 169) means that even inside linguistic contexts like speech or attitude reports, modal or conditionalized statements, or reports of past events, the use-conditional content cannot be evaluated in that semantic context but always conveys something about the context of the utterance itself (Potts 2007c: 166):

(79) **Nondisplaceability**—Expressives predicate something of the utterance situation.

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[33] For arguments for this distinction, cf. Potts 2005: 32–36 and Gutzmann 2012: 72–82. For an opposing position, cf. Schlenker 2007.

The nondisplaceability of the content of UCIs is a further property that sets them apart from ordinary truth-conditional elements. The truth-conditional meaning of regular non-use-conditional language does not have to be about the utterance situation but may easily be shifted in order to refer to things, events, or attitudes that are not present in the actual utterance situation. This is mostly impossible for UCIs. Displacement, as Hockett (1958: 579) calls it, is often assumed to be one of the "design features" of human languages, setting them apart from other forms of communication (Coleman 2006; Hockett & Altmann 1968). According to Cruse (1986), use-conditional meaning therefore shows similarities to non-verbal communication like gestures or mimic.[34]

> Another characteristic distinguishing expressive meaning from propositional meaning is that it is valid only for the utterer, at the time and place of utterance. This limitation it shares with, for instance, a smile, a frown, a gesture of impatience [...].   (Cruse 1986: 272)

Since UCIs lack the possibility of being displaced—at least to some extent, as we will see—they have in this respect more in common with non-verbal communication or the direct signaling nature of non-human communicative systems found in animal communication, which are lacking the property of displacement.

> Animal communication seems to be designed exclusively for this moment, here and now. It cannot effectively be used to relate events that are far removed in time and place. When your dog says GRRR, it means GRRR, *right now*, because dogs don't seem to be capable of communicating GRRR, *last night, over in the park*. In contrast, human language users are normally capable of producing messages equivalent to GRRR, *last night, over in the park*, and then going on to say *In fact, I'll be going back tomorrow for some more*.
>   (Yule 2006: 9)

Besides the past tense that Yule (2006) uses in his example, common linguistic means to displace the interpretation of an expression include speech or attitude reporting verbs, modal elements, or conditional clauses, amongst many others. In the following examples (80b)–(80f), the propositional content that Peter's Porsche is pink, expressed by (80a), is displaced to the semantic context created by these constructions.

(80) a. Peter's Porsche is pink.
      b. Peter's Porsche **was** pink.
      c. **Penny says that** Peter's Porsche is pink.

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[34] Also cited by Potts (2007c: 169).

    d. **Penny believes that** Peter's Porsche is pink.
    e. Peter's Porsche **may** be pink.
    f. **If Penny loves Peter**, Peter's Porsche is pink.

In all derived variants of (80a), the proposition that Peter's Porsche is pink does not have to hold in the actual situation, but in the context to which it is displaced.[35]

    When trying to do the same with use-conditional content, we see that this is indeed hardly possible. Building on Yule's (2006) examples from the quotation above, example (81) shows that an expressive interjection like *ouch* behaves more like the GRRR of a dog with respect to displacement than its truth-conditional counterpart in (82).

(81) a. Ouch!
      b. #Ouch, last night, over in the kitchen!

(82) a. I feel pain!
      b. I felt pain, last night, over in the kitchen.

Interjections are an extreme example since they are very isolated from the linguistic context. However, nondisplaceability holds also for use-conditional content that is more integrated into the syntax of a sentence than interjections are. The expressive attitude expressed by *bastard*, for instance, escapes all attempts to displace it to a non-actual context as shown by the infelicity of continuing the utterance with a sentence that contradicts the negative attitude of *bastard* (cf. Potts 2007c: 170 f.).

(83) a. That bastard Kresge is late for work.
      b. That bastard Kresge was late for work yesterday. #But he's no bastard today, because today he was on time.
      c. Sue says that that bastard Kresge should be fired. #I think he's a good guy.
      d. Sue believes that that bastard Kresge should be fired. #I think he's a good guy.
      e. Maybe that bastard Kresge will be late again. #But if not, he's a good guy.
      f. #If that bastard Kresge arrives on time, he should be fired for being so mean.

The negative attitude towards Kresge that is expressed by *bastard* in these examples is interpreted with respect to the context of the entire utterance. That is, even if *bastard* is syntactically embedded, semantically it nevertheless conveys that the speaker bears a negative attitude towards Kresge in the actual utterance context.

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[35] Semantically, each of (80b)–(80f) is, of course, compatible with Peter's Porsche being pink.

However, nondisplaceability seems to be not as strong a constraint on use-conditional meaning as Potts's (2007c) formulation in (79) suggests. At least for speech and attitude reports, there are instances in which a UCI is interpreted with respect to the context of the reported speech or attitude—at least, if the right conditions apply. In particular, the use-conditional content can be ascribed to the subject of the reported context and not the speaker of the utterance context, contrary to what is demanded by (79). Potts (2007c: 172) provides an example which he adopts from Kratzer (1999).

(84) **My father screamed** that he would never allow me to marry that **bastard** Webster.

The negative attitude towards Webster conveyed by *bastard* is obviously not attributed to the speaker of (84), but to her father. This can be made more obvious by the following two continuations.

(85) a. My father screamed that he would never allow me to marry that bastard Webster. But I love him so much that I don't care about my father's opinion.
      b. My father screamed that he would never allow me to marry that bastard Webster. #He thinks that I do not deserve such a decent guy.

For further examples of displaced expressives, see amongst others Amaral et al. (2007) or Anand (2007). Interestingly, not all UCIs seem to behave the same way. Some are relatively easy to shift while others may never be displaced. In her paper on modal particles and contexts shift Döring (2013) [this volume] discusses the displacement potential of different German modal particles and shows that even in this special class of UCIs, variation with respect to shiftability is attested.

However, even if there are cases in which a UCI can receive a shifted interpretation, Potts (2007c: 173) argues that they do not challenge the nondisplaceability argument. Instead they point to the *perspective dependence* of UCIs.

5.3. *Perspective Dependence*

The function of using expressives and use-conditional language in general is not to make objective statements about facts in the world nor to convince the hearer that some state of affairs holds. Instead, they are used to display emotions, feeling or attitudes in a more direct way than any truth-conditional statement would do. By default, UCIs display the emotions or attitudes of the speaker. However, this does not need to be the case, as shown by example (84) above, in which the emotional attitude is ascribed to the

reported subject. Potts (2007c: 173) argues that this shifted interpretation does not show that UCIs can be displaced after all, but that they generally depend on a perspective from which they are evaluated (Potts 2007c: 166).

(86) **Perspective dependence**—Expressive content is evaluated from a particular perspective. In general, the perspective is the speaker's, but there can be deviations if conditions are right.

The idea is that the interpretation of UCIs is not shifted to the context introduced by an attitude or speech report predicate like *scream* in (84), but that they are nonetheless interpreted at the utterance level. However, they are evaluated with respect to the perspective of a salient individual. Following Lasersohn's (2005) influential account of predicates of personal taste, Potts (2007c: 173) calls this individual the contextual *judge*. Like the speaker, the judge appears as a parameter of the utterance context. In many if not most contexts, the two parameters are set to the same individual, that is, in most contexts, the speaker is also the judge, according to whom perspectival expressions are evaluated. However, there are cases in which an individual other than the speaker is so salient that (s)he counts as the judge of the utterance, even if—for obvious reasons—(s)he cannot count as the speaker.[36] In (84), "*my father* picks out an agent that is so salient and so powerful in the context of the sentence that he becomes not only the attitudinal and deontic judge but also the contextual one" (Potts 2007c: 175).

According to this view on the interpretation of use-conditional content, UCIs are not actually shifted, even if they are not interpreted with respect to the speaker. Instead, they are always interpreted at root level, but can be evaluated with respect to an individual other than the speaker if the contextual conditions are such that the judge parameter is set to a different individual. The intuition that, in cases like (84), a UCI is interpreted in a shifted context can however be explained as well by this view. Since the subject of the matrix speech or attitude report can be salient enough to become the contextual judge—like in (84)—one may get the impression that a UCI is interpreted in the shifted context.

A prediction that this approach to seemingly-shifted UCIs makes is that a non-speaker evaluation of a UCI should not depend on the presence of any linguistic context-shifter like propositional attitude predicates or reported speech. Instead, they should be freely shiftable, as long as the right

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[36] Direct quotations being an obvious exception, of course.

circumstances apply to establish a non-speaker judge. This prediction is indeed confirmed by examples like the following—borrowed from Potts 2007c—in which there is already enough sarcasm involved to set the judge parameter to the authors of the CPJ report instead of to the blogger.

(87)   A CPJ report on Venezuela tells us how problems have "escalated" in Venezuela under Chavez, i.e. the physical attacks against journalists under previous presidents have "escalated" to Chavez calling the opposition, which includes the media, names. This is very, very serious, but I don't think another coup attempt is called for until Chavez resorts to dramatic irony or sarcasm. But if **that vicious bastard** uses litotes, then there's no other rational choice than an immediate invasion.   (Potts 2007c: 175 f., my emphasis, DG)

In two recent papers, Harris & Potts (2009a,b) try to pin-point the circumstances under which UCIs can be interpreted in a shifted context by empirical experiments.

    If the view on the "shiftablity" of use-conditional content just sketched is sound, then examples like (84) or (87) do not challenge the nondisplaceability of use-conditional content but instead highlight its perspective dependence. This perspectivity is what makes them shiftable in a nontechnical sense. However, they convey something about the utterance situation, namely about the contextual judge, which does not need to equal the speaker under the right conditions.

5.4. *Descriptive Ineffability*

By *descriptive ineffability*, Potts (2007c: 166) means that it is hard, if not impossible, to completely translate use-conditional content into purely truth-conditional language.

(88)   **Descriptive ineffability**—Speakers are never fully satisfied when they paraphrase expressive content using descriptive, i.e., nonexpressive, terms.

The theoretical status of descriptive ineffability as a sound property of use-conditional content is not clear. Geurts (2007: 211) criticizes it as a special property since it does not "draw the line between descriptive and expressive language". It can be found all over the lexicon, not just with UCIs. Clear examples are provided by grammatical expressions or function words like articles, conjunctions, or even prepositions, for which speakers, if "pressed for definitions, they resort to illustrating where the words would be appropriately used" (Potts 2007c: 176). But also for adjectives like *languid, green*, or *pretty*, many speakers would have difficulties giving a satisfying paraphrase without resorting to contexts of application (Geurts 2007: 211). Finally, even for simple nouns like *house* or *dog* it is not easy to give a precise

definition that covers all aspects of their use, not to mention complex expressions like *knowledge* or *truth* for which literally thousands of pages have been spent to develop a definition that accounts for all of their uses. In this respect, I agree with Geurts (2007). The impossibility to be paraphrased in a satisfactory way is not something that is unique to use-conditional content alone.

However, I think that Potts (2007c) is right about descriptive ineffability in another respect. Employing use-conditional language is really different from using truth-conditional expressions. That is, even if we can find a perfect paraphrase for a UCI in purely truth-conditional terms and even if they *mean* (in a non-technical sense) the same, they do not *express* the same. So, let us follow Kaplan (1999: 17) and assume that the use-conditional meaning of the interjection *oops* corresponds to the truth-conditional meaning of *I just observed a minor mishap*. And, for the sake of the argument, let us suppose that this is a perfect paraphrase.

(89) a. Oops!
      b. I just observed a minor mishap.

Then, even if they both *mean* the same, they *express* this differently. (89a) expresses that meaning in a use-conditional way, i.e., it is felicitously used in a context in which the speaker just observed a minor mishap. It is a direct expression of that observation, rather than a statement about it. This contrasts with an utterance of (89b) which is an actual statement about a fact in the world, which could therefore be challenged.[37]

(90) A: Oops!
      B: #That's not true. That was intentional!

(91) A: I just observed a minor mishap.
      B: That's not true. That was intentional!

Hence, even if (90A) and (91A) depict the same situation, namely one in which the speaker has just observed a minor mishap, they express this content in a fundamentally different way. In the words of Kaplan (1999: 8), use-conditional content *expresses* or *displays*, while truth-conditional content *decribes*. These differences in the *modus of expressing* are of course the reason why use-conditional and truth-conditional content are independent from each other and cannot be merged into a single dimension of meaning,

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[37] That does not mean however, that UCIs are error-proof and cannot characterize a situation incorrectly. However, infelicitously used UCIs are not apt to be judged as false.

not even a conjoined one.[38] And it is also the rationale behind Potts's (2007c) descriptive ineffability. Hence, I suggest to modify Potts's (2007c) original statement of descriptive ineffability to focus more on this aspect than on the fact that it is hard to come up with a satisfying paraphrase.

(92)   **Descriptive ineffability** (modified)—It is impossible to paraphrase use-conditional content using only truth-conditional expressions without changing the modus of expressing.

Thinking about descriptive ineffability in this way captures the intuition that use-conditional content functions differently from regular truth-conditional content, and that the two kinds of meaning cannot be exchanged freely for each other.

5.5. *Immediacy*

With the property of immediacy, Potts (2007c: 167) draws a parallel between UCIs and performative speech acts.

(93)   **Immediacy**—Like performatives, expressives achieve their intended act simply by being uttered; they do not offer content so much as inflict it.

Potts (2007c: 180) provides promises as an example. By just uttering a performative construction like (94), one performs the named speech act and expresses that one is doing so.

(94)   I promise that I will be back tonight.

Hence, it is not intelligible to say that one is not going to fulfill what one has just promised, as shown in (95a). Furthermore, (95b) shows that one can also not take back that one has just made a promise.

(95)   I promise that I will be back for dinner.
       a. #But I plan to be back tomorrow.
       b. #But I made no promises that I will.

UCIs behave in the same way, as we have already seen from some examples. For instance, (83b) shows that it is infelicitous to take back the negative attitude conveyed by *bastard* by continuing with *But he's no bastard today* (Potts 2007c: 180). Moreover, as for the performative promise, it is also not possible to deny that one has just expressed a negative attitude.

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   [38]   In some sense, then, the distinction between displayed and described content mirrors Strawson's (1950) disentanglement of asserted and presupposed content, which were merged into a single (conjoined) dimension by Russell (1905).

(96) That bastard Kresge was late for work yesterday.
    a. #But he's no bastard today, because today he was on time.
    b. #But I expressed no negative feelings towards Kaplan by saying this.

Interestingly, the restriction that one cannot deny one's own speech act holds also for speech acts that are not explicitly performative, like the promise in (94), but also for more structurally determined speech acts like assertions or questions.[39]

(97) a. David is a zombie. #But I did not assert that he is a zombie.
    b. Is David a zombie? #But I did not ask you whether he is a zombie.

Potts (2007c: 180) argues that performatives and other direct speech acts also mirror the behavior of UCIs with respect to their inability to be denied in discourse. Just as one cannot deny the negative attitude of an expressive UCI, one cannot deny that your interlocutor has just performed an assertion, for instance.

(98) A: That bastard Kresge was late for work yesterday.
    B: #No, you like him.

(99) A: David is a zombie.
    B: #No, you didn't just assert that.

The parallelism between use-conditional content and speech acts can be pushed even further. In fact, it could be argued that sentence mood (that is, the structurally encoded speech act potential in, e.g., a declarative or interrogative) is a UCI—a view that is suggested by Portner (2007), and that I have developed in Gutzmann 2008, 2012. Instead of conveying something truth-conditionally, sentence mood imposes use conditions on an utterance. Therefore, an analysis that accounts for UCIs and denial may also work for assertions or questions.

    The property of immediacy is also a consequence of the fact that use-conditional content behaves differently from truth-conditional content. That UCIs achieve their intended effect just by being uttered suggests that they are closely related to the utterance context. This also fits their

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[39] This is in line with what Austin (1962) already had in mind. Once we think of utterances as speech *acts*, it seems to be a matter of (virtual) conceptual necessity that one cannot "take back" those actions. This not only holds for the illocutionary act but obviously also for the phatic and rhetic act.

(i)   David is a zombie. #But I did not say "David is a zombie".
(ii)   David is a zombie. #But I did not say that he is a zombie.

nondisplaceability. To account for this, the context-relatedness must somehow be built directly into the semantics of UCIs.

5.6. *Repeatability*

The last property Potts (2007c: 167) lists is that UCIs can be repeated without redundancy. Instead, the repetition of an expressive intensifies the expressed emotion.

(100) **Repeatability**—If a speaker repeatedly uses an expressive item, the effect is generally one of strengthening the emotive content, rather than one of redundancy.

To illustrate this, Potts (2007c: 182) uses the following list of examples, which contain more and more repetitions of the same expressive.

(101) a. **Damn**, I left my keys in the car.
  b. **Damn**, I left my **damn** keys in the car.
  c. **Damn**, I left my **damn** keys in the **damn** car.

The more instances of *damn* are used, the stronger (the expression of the) emotional attitude of the speaker or judge gets, with no redundancy at all. According to Potts (2007c), this contrasts with truth-conditional content that cannot be repeated in the same way without, becoming redundant. Even if Potts (2007c) notes that, due to the descriptive ineffability of use-conditional content, it is hard to find a minimal contrasting example that only involves truth-conditional language, he illustrates this with the following example (Potts 2007c: 182):

(102) #I'm angry! I forgot my keys. I'm angry! They are in the car. I'm angry!

However, as already observed by Geurts (2007), repeatability is not a good candidate for a characteristic property of use-conditional content. First, there are also truth-conditional expressions that do not lead to redundancy but whose regular semantic effect is strengthened if used repetitively. Potts (2007c) himself mentioned the case of (103a), but dismisses it as a counterexample since such examples can be analyzed compositionally. He argues that the first *big* can be analyzed as modifying *big big apple*, while the second modifies *big apple* and the last one just *apple*. Therefore, we are not repetitively applying the adjective to the same argument but to an already modified argument. This reasoning should also apply to truth-conditional intensifiers like *very* if used more than once.

(103) a. Peter ate a big big big apple.
  b. David is very very very large.

However, Potts's (2007c) aim is to finally give a compositional analysis for the intensifying effect of the repetition of expressive UCIs like *damn* in (101b) and (101c) and, therefore, I do not see any reason for not counting examples like the ones in (103a) as instances of truth-conditional repetition without redundancy.[40]

Given this data, it can already be concluded that repeatability is not a distinctive property of use-conditional content. Moreover, this generalization does not even carry over to other kinds of UCI besides expressives in the narrow sense. For instance, interjections and other isolated UCIs are not repeatable without sounding odd.

(104) a. #Oops! I forgot my keys. Oops! They are in the car. Oops!
     b. #Ouch! I've hit my thumb. Ouch! It was the hammer. Ouch!

Contra Potts (2007c), I think that repeatability is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for use-conditional content and therefore, it cannot be used to differentiate between truth-conditional and use-conditional content.

6. Summary

Use-conditional content comes in many different varieties and from many empirical domains of language. This is what the survey of this chapter has shown, even if it could only touch upon a small selection of all kinds of use-conditional meaning that can be found across natural languages. While in a majority of cases, use-conditional content is bound to words, there are also constructions below and beyond the word level that are conventionally associated with non-truth-conditional meaning.

The description of the different items by which use-conditional content can be conveyed has shown that not every UCI behaves in the same way with respect to how it interacts with the truth-conditional dimension of meaning. I distinguish these different types of UCIs by means of some binary features, which allows us to differentiate between five types of UCIs, as summarized in Table 1. The purest form of use-conditional content is

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[40] Geurts (2007: 214) mentions a further problem for Potts's (2007c) line of reasoning. According to Potts's approach, the instances of *damn* in (101c) apply to different arguments and hence express emotional attitudes towards different objects, which means there should be no intensification effect at all. Another way of analyzing (101c) would be to say that all instances of *damn* apply to the entire event. Then, however, (101c) is not very different from (103b) or (103a).

provided by isolated expletives. These are interjections like Kaplan's (1999) *ouch* and *oops* that contribute use conditions by themselves, without needing any argument (*–functional*), and which do not contribute anything to the truth-conditional dimension of meaning (*–2-dimensional*). They contrast with functional expletives like *damn* in *that damn dog*, which also convey no truth-conditional content (*–2-dimensional*) but which need an argument in order to express a proper use condition (*+functional*). Functional expletives also pass back their argument unmodified, what makes (*–resource-sensitive*), in contrast to functional shunting UCIs, which do not. What I have called isolated mixed UCIs differ from isolated expletives in the other feature. Examples are ethnic slurs like *Kraut* or other coloured expressions like *cur*. They are also isolated, because their use-conditional content needs no argument (*–functional*), but in contrast to isolated expletives, they have an additional truth-conditional meaning component (*+2-dimensional*). The fourth type—functional mixed UCIs—is the most complex one from an interactional point of view. These UCIs need an argument for their use-conditional component (*+functional*) and contribute to the truth-conditional tier (*+2-dimensional*) at the same time. In (62)–(65), I have given informal composition schemas for the five types of UCI that illustrate how they interact with the truth-conditional content.

Despite the different types of use-conditional content and the variety of linguistic means to express it, there are some characteristic properties that can be attributed to UCIs, which can function as a heuristic to detect them. I have reviewed the list of features developed by Potts (2007c), in order to check whether they are characteristic of use-conditional content. The most important and identifying feature of UCIs is, of course, that they do not affect the truth conditions of a sentence, but instead, impose use conditions on the felicity of the utterance of that sentence. This different modus of expressing content is responsible for the majority of the distinctive properties of UCIs. It is what Potts (2007c) calls *independence*, by which he means that the two modi of expressing contribute to two different dimensions of meaning. The truth conditions of a sentence do not depend on its use-conditional content, and *vice versa*.

The nondisplaceability of UCIs is also closely connected to their use-conditional nature. Use conditions are mostly imposed on the actual utterance and evaluated in the current context, and not on a semantic context created by the linguistic environment. The nondisplaceability of UCIs renders them similar to non-verbal forms of communication like gestures or to animal communication, both of which lack the ability to be interpreted in a non-actual context. And even if UCIs are (of course) arbitrarily and by

convention connected with the content they express, their nondisplaceability makes it reasonable to think of them as being more like *indices/signals* instead of *symbols* in semiotic terms. There are obvious counterexamples to nondisplaceability, but according to Potts (2007c) they stem from the *perspective dependence* of UCIs. That is, the evaluation of use-conditional content always depends on a contextual judge which, by default, is the speaker but who could be a different individual if it is salient enough in the actual utterance context. Another aspect of the observation that use-conditional content is closely tied to the utterance context, is what Potts (2007c) calls *immediacy*. Like performatives, UCIs alter the context directly when uttered.

One of the properties from Potts's (2007c) list, that does not prove to be very helpful in distinguishing use-conditional from truth-conditional content, is descriptive ineffability. Finding satisfying and correct paraphrases for use-conditional content is very difficult, but so it is for many truth-conditional terms. However, if understood more broadly, descriptive ineffability means that one cannot substitute use-conditional content with truth-conditional content—even if has the same content—without changing the modus of expressing that content. Repeatability is also not a good candidate for a characteristic of use-conditional content as there are both UCIs that cannot be repeated without redundancy and truth-conditional expressions that can.

7. The Individual Papers

The UCIs that have received, by far, the most attention, are what I have called expressives in the narrow sense. However, as this survey has shown, use-conditional content comes in a great variety of forms. The papers in this collection address some of these.

In their contribution *German non-inflectional constructions as separate performatives*, Sebastian Bücking and Jennifer Rau study the form and interpretation of German non-inflectional constructions like those presented in (60). Making use of Portner's (2007) modification of Potts's (2005) logic, they analyze the special syntax and semantics of these morphological UCIs and argue that they can be viewed as separate performatives.

As discussed in § 5.2, nondisplaceability has been questioned as a defining feature of use-conditional content. However, as Sophia Döring shows in her empirical investigation of the relation between *Modal particles and context shift*, not all UCIs can be context-shifted in the same way. Presenting new data on modal particles drawn from German corpora, she shows

that modal particles show variation regarding the linguistic contexts that can induce a shifted interpretation.

Modal particles are also dealt with in MARKUS EGG's paper *Discourse particles, common ground, and felicity conditions*. Instead of discussing their shiftability, Egg builds on the vast descriptive literature on modal particles in German to delevop a formal approach to their meaning. In order to capture their use-conditional nature, he relates them to the common ground and analyzes them as expressions imposing felicity conditions on the relation an utterance bears to the previous one. More radically, he argues that even the felicity conditions of the two utterances can serve as the semantic argument of a particle.

Besides particles, personal pronouns seem to be well suited to express use-conditional content on the word level, as we have seen in § 2.3. In his contribution *I love me some datives: Expressive meaning, free datives, and F-implicature*, LAURENCE R. HORN presents a detailed analysis of the personal dative in English, relating it to other variants of free datives in different languages and to other UCIs like modal particles. Moreover, going back to the writings of Frege, he embeds his investigation into a historical and theoretical discussion of how use-conditional content fits into the division of labour between semantics and pragmatics, reaching back to the writings of Frege.

In some respects, ERIC MCCREADY AND YOHEI TAKAHASHI step into Grice's shoes and take up his original example of a conventional implicature, when they divide the meaning of the Japanese connective *mono* into a truth-conditional, asserted component on the one hand, and a non-truth-conditional but nevertheless conventional dimension of meaning on the other hand. Besides discussing the notion of *Good reasons*, they show how the formal logic developed in McCready 2010 can be used to deal with mixed UCIs.

In her detailed investigation, SOPHIE REPP examines various means of *Common ground management: Modal particles, illocutionary negation and VERUM*. She argues that modal particles, illocutionary negation as expressed by the operator FALSUM, and the operator VERUM are common-ground managing operators, which indicate the status of a proposition relative to the common ground (newness, expectedness, speaker commitment etc.). Although they are non-truth-conditional, common-ground managing operators can nevertheless influence the truth-conditional meaning of a sentence, as Repp argues. She illustrates this in detail for the scopal interaction of negation and epistemic modal verbs in German. The observed effects are argued to be due to the negative marker denoting either propositional nega-

tion or the operator FALSUM, and to common-ground managing operators determining to a large degree the discourse appropriateness of the utterance they occur in.

YASUTADA SUDO's contribution deals with the use conditions of *Biased polar questions in English and Japanese*. Starting with English and the classical distinction between negative and positive bias, Sudo uses data from Japanese to show that this distinction is too coarse-grained. Accordingly, he extends the distinction by adding the notion of evidential and epistemic bias. Sudo examines how these attitudes—which are not part of the truth-conditionally relevant question meaning but impose use conditions on the proper use of the question—can be expressed in Japanese by the conventional means of different intonation patterns and certain question particles.

Concluding this collection, HENK ZEEVAT examines the borderline between expressive meaning and presuppositions in his paper *Expressing surprise by particles*, in which he develops a new approach to the meaning of focus particles. In contrast to the vast majority of accounts of such expressions, his approach is non-truth-conditional in nature and is based on the idea that emotions like surprise should play a major role in linguistic semantics. He furthermore argues that focus particles are a case in which the use-conditional and the truth-conditional dimension of meaning cannot be fully separated, shedding doubt on the property of independence discussed in § 5.1 above.

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